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Abstract 
This paper is the first that applies a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator, 
to the banking industry. This approach is able to measure competition of bank market 
segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of competition 
can consider the entire banking market only. A caveat of the Boone-indicator may be that 
it assumes that banks generally pass on at least part of their efficiency gains to their clients. 
Like most other model-based measures, this approach ignores differences in bank product 
quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We measure competition 
on the lending markets in the five major euro countries as well as, for comparison, the UK, 
the US and Japan. Bearing the mentioned caveats in mind, our findings indicate that 
over the period 1994-2004 the US had the most competitive loan market, whereas overall 
loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in the EU. 
The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position, whereas in Italy competition 
declined significantly over time. The French, Japanese and UK loan markets were generally 
less competitive. Turning to competition among specific types of banks, commercial banks 
tend to be more competitive, particularly in Germany and the US, than savings and 
cooperative banks. 
JEL classification: D4, G21, L1. 
Keywords: Banking industry, competition, loan markets, marginal costs, market shares. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the measurement of competition in the EU banking sector. Competition 
is a key driver of social welfare, as it may push down prices (i.e. interest rates) and improves 
services for consumers and enterprises [Cetorelli (2001)].1 Also, competition is pivotal to 
monetary policy: in a competitive market, changes in the policy rates of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) are passed on more quickly to the interest rates that banks offer their customers. 
The paper presents estimates of competition in loan markets of the major EU 
countries using a new approach, introduced and applied by Boone (2000 and 2004), Boone 
et al. (2004) and CPB (2000). So far this method has not been applied to banking markets.2 
The so-called Boone indicator measures the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of 
profits or market shares. The idea behind the Boone indicator is that competition enhances 
the performance of efficient firms and impairs the performance of inefficient firms, which is 
reflected in their respective profits or market shares. This approach is related to the well-known 
efficiency hypothesis, which also explains banks’ performances by differences in efficiency 
[Goldberg and Rai (1996); Smirlock (1985)]. 
A well-known problem in the banking industry is that competition cannot be measured 
directly, as costs and often also price data of single banking products are usually unavailable. 
Hence, indirect measures are needed. This paper adds to the competition literature in 
applying a new competition indicator to the banking sector which is an improvement on 
widely accepted concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). 
The HHI has the disadvantage of not distinguishing between large and small countries. 
Furthermore, concentration may also be due to consolidation forced by severe competition. 
Hence, the concentration index is an ambiguous measure.3 
Our approach to competition is also innovative in the sense that we can measure 
competition not only for the entire banking market, but also for various product markets, such 
as the loan market, and for several types of banks, such as commercial, savings banks and 
cooperative banks. An often applied measure such as the Panzar-Rosse model only 
investigates the competitive nature of the total of all banking activities. Another advantage of 
the Boone indicator is that it requires relatively little data, different from, e.g. the Bresnahan 
model which is very data intensive. This allows the estimation of competition on an annual 
basis to assess developments over time. A disadvantage of the Boone-indicator is that it 
assumes that banks generally pass on at least part of their efficiency gains to their clients. Like 
many other model-based measures, our approach ignores differences in bank product quality 
and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of different 
approaches in the literature to measure banking competition. Section 3 provides a theoretical 
basis for the Boone indicator as a new measure for competition and discusses its properties. 
The data are described in the following section. The econometric method and the results are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                          
1. However, as is stressed by Allen et al. (2001), there is a conflict between this traditional view, stemming from the 
industrial organisation literature, and more recent theoretical models of bank competition, which raise the question 
whether competition between banks is good or bad. See, for example, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). 
2. Boone has applied his indicator to various manufacturing industries and Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2007) to the life 
insurance business. 
3. A world-wide study by Claessens and Laeven (2004) found that bank concentration was positively instead of 
negatively related to competition. 
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2 Literature on measuring competition 
Competition in the banking sector has been analysed by measuring market power 
and efficiency. A well-known approach to measuring market power is suggested by 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), recently used by Bikker (2003) and Uchida and 
Tsutsui (2005). They analyse bank behaviour on an aggregate level and estimate the average 
conjectural variation of banks. A high conjectural variation implies that a bank is highly aware of 
its interdependence with other firms in terms of output and prices (via the demand equation). 
Under perfect competition where output price equals marginal costs, the conjectural variation 
between banks should be zero, whereas a value of one would indicate monopoly. 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose an approach based on the so-called H-statistic 
which is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the input 
prices. This H-statistic ranges from -∞ to 1. An H-value equal to or smaller than zero indicates 
monopoly or perfect collusion, whereas a value between zero and one provides evidence of a 
range of oligopolistic or monopolistic types of competition. A value of one points to perfect 
competition. This approach has been applied to all EU countries by Bikker and Haaf (2002). 
A third indicator for market power is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, which measures 
the degree of market concentration. This indicator is often used in the context of the 
‘Structure Conduct Performance’ (SCP) model [see e.g. Berger et al. (2004) and Bos (2004)], 
which assumes that market structure affects banks’ behaviour, which in turn determines 
their performance.4 The idea is that banks with larger market shares may have more market 
power and use that. Moreover, a smaller number of banks make collusion more likely. 
To test the SCP-hypothesis, performance (profit) is explained by market structure (as measured 
by the HHI). 
Market power may also be related to profit, in the sense that extremely high profits 
may be indicative of a lack of competition. A traditional measure of profitability is the 
price-cost margin (PCM), which is equal to the output price minus the marginal costs, divided 
by the output price. The PCM is frequently used in the empirical industrial organization 
literature as an empirical approximation of the theoretical Lerner index.5 In the literature, 
banks’ efficiency is often seen as a proxy of competition. The existence of scale and scope 
economies has in the past been investigated thoroughly. It is often assumed that unused 
scale economies would be exploited and, consequently, reduced under strong competition.6 
Hence, the existence of non-exhausted scale economies is an indication that the potential 
to reduce costs has not been exhausted and, therefore, can be seen as an indirect indicator of 
(a lack of) competition [Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2007)]. The existence of scale efficiency 
is also important as regards the potential entry of new firms, which is a major determinant of 
competition. Strong scale effects would put new firms into an unfavourable position. 
                                                                          
4. Bikker and Bos (2005), pages 22 and 23. 
5. The Lerner index derives from the monopolist's profit maximisation condition as price minus marginal cost, divided by 
price. The monopolist maximises profits when the Lerner index is equal to the inverse price elasticity of market demand. 
Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is zero (market demand is infinitely elastic), in monopoly it approaches one 
for positive non-zero marginal cost. The Lerner index can be derived for intermediary cases as well. For a discussion 
see Church and Ware (2000). 
6. This interpretation would be different in a market numbering only a few firms. Furthermore, this interpretation would 
also change when many new entries incur unfavourable scale effects during the initial phase of their growth path. 
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A whole strand of literature is focused on X-efficiency, which reflects managerial 
ability to drive down production costs, controlled for output volumes and input price levels. 
The X-efficiency of firm i is defined as the difference in costs between that firm and the best 
practice firms of similar size and input prices [Leibenstein (1966)]. Heavy competition is 
expected to force banks to drive down their X-inefficiency, so that the latter is often used 
as an indirect measure of competition. An overview of the empirical literature is presented in 
Bikker (2004) and Bikker and Bos (2005). 
A final area in the literature has been devoted to the Structure Conduct Performance 
(SCP) model where conduct reflects competitive behaviour. This hypothesis assumes that 
market structure affects competitive behaviour and, hence, performance. Many articles test 
this model jointly with an alternative explanation of performance, namely the efficiency 
hypothesis, which attributes differences in performance (or profit) to differences in 
efficiency [e.g. Goldberg and Rai (1996) and Smirlock (1985)]. As mentioned above, the Boone 
indicator can be seen as an elaboration on this efficiency hypothesis. This test is based on 
estimating an equation which explains profits by market structure variables and measures 
of efficiency. The efficiency hypothesis assumes that market structure variables do not 
contribute to profits once efficiency is considered as cause of profit. As Bikker and Bos (2005) 
show, this test suffers from a multicollinearity problem if the efficiency hypothesis holds. 
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3 The Boone indicator model 
Boone’s model is based on the notion, first, that more efficient firms (that is, firms with 
lower marginal costs) gain higher market shares or profits and, second, that this effect 
is stronger the heavier the competition in that market is. In order to support this quite 
intuitive market characteristic, Boone develops a broad set of theoretical models [see Boone 
(2000, 2001 and 2004), Boone et al. (2004) and CPB (2000)]. We use one of these models to 
explain the Boone indicator and to examine its properties compared to common measures 
such as the HHI and PCM approaches. Following Boone et al. (2004), and replacing ‘firms’ 
by ‘banks’, we consider a banking industry where each bank i produces one product qi 
(or portfolio of banking products), which faces a demand curve of the form: 
 
p (qi, qj≠i) = a – b qi – d ∑j≠i qj  (1) 
 
and has constant marginal costs mci. This bank maximizes profits πi = (pi – mci)  qi by choosing 
the optimal output level qi. We assume that a > mci and 0 < d ≤ b. The first-order condition for 
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can then be written as: 
 
a –2 b qi – d ∑ i≠j qj – mci = 0  (2) 
 
When N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order conditions (2), 
yielding: 
 
qi (ci) = [(2 b/d – 1) a – (2 b/d + N – 1) mci + ∑ j mcj]/[(2 b + d (N – 1))(2 b/d – 1)]  (3) 
 
We define profits πi as variable profits excluding entry costs ε. Hence, a bank enters 
the banking industry if, and only if, πi ≥ ε in equilibrium. Note that Equation (3) provides a 
relationship between output and marginal costs. It follows from πi = (pi – mci) qi that profits 
depend on marginal costs in a quadratic way. 
In this market, competition can increase in two ways. First, competition increases 
when the produced (portfolios of) services of the various banks become closer substitutes, that 
is, d increases (keeping d below b). Second, competition increases when entry costs ε decline. 
Boone et al. (2004) prove that market shares of more efficient banks (that is, with lower 
marginal costs c) increase both under regimes of stronger substitution and amid lower entry 
costs. 
Equation (3) supports the use of the following model for market share, defined  
as si = qi / ∑ j qj: 
 
ln si = α + β ln mci  (4) 
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The market shares of banks with lower marginal costs are expected to increase, 
so that β is negative. The stronger competition is, the stronger this effect will be, and the larger, 
in absolute terms, this (negative) value of β. We refer to the β parameter as the Boone 
indicator. For empirical reasons, Equation (4) has been specified in log-linear terms in order to 
deal with heteroskedasticty. Moreover, this specification implies that β is an elasticity, which 
facilitates easy interpretation, particularly across equations.7 The choice of functional form is 
not essential, as the log-linear form is just an approximation of the pure linear form. 
In Section 5.2.1, we will find that the results of the linear model are very similar to those of 
the log-linear model. 
 The theoretical model above can also be used to explain why widely-applied 
measures such as the HHI and the PCM fail as reliable competition indicators. The standard 
intuition of the HHI is based on a Cournot model with symmetric banks, where a fall in entry 
barriers reduces the HHI. However, with banks that differ in efficiency an increase in 
competition through a rise in d reallocates output to the more efficient banks that already had 
higher output levels. Hence, the increase in competition raises the HHI. The effect of increased 
competition on the industry’s PCM may also be perverse. Generally, heavier competition 
reduces the PCM of all banks. But since more efficient banks may have a higher PCM 
(skimming off part of the profits stemming from their efficiency lead), the increase of their 
market share may raise the industry’s average PCM, contrary to common expectations. 
We note that the Boone indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification of reality. 
First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower costs either into higher profits or into lower 
output prices in order to gain market share. Our approach assumes that the behaviour of banks is 
between these two extreme cases, so that banks generally pass on at least part of their efficiency 
gains to their clients. More precisely, we assume that the banks’ passing-on behaviour, which drives 
Equation (4), does not diverge too strongly across the banks. Second, our approach ignores 
differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We 
assume that banks are forced over time to provide quality levels that are more or less similar. By the 
same token, we presume that banks have to follow the innovations of their peers. Hence, like many 
other model-based measures, the Boone indicator approach focuses on one important relationship, 
affected by competition, thereby disregarding other aspects [see also Bikker and Bos (2005)]. 
Naturally, annual estimates of β are more likely to be impaired by these distortions than the 
estimates covering the full sample period. Also, compared to direct measures of competition, the 
Boone indicator may have the disadvantage of being an estimate and thus surrounded by a degree 
of uncertainty. Of course, other model-based measures, such as Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic, 
suffer from the same disadvantage. The latter shortcoming concerns to the annual estimates βt 
rather than the full sample period estimate β. 
 As the Boone indicator may be time dependent, reflecting changes in competition 
over time, we estimate β separately for every year (hence, βt). We do not have an absolute 
benchmark for the level of β. We only know that the more negative β is, the stronger 
competition must be. Comparing the indicator across regions or countries, or even across 
industries, may help to interpret estimation results. For that reason, Boone and Weigand in 
CPB (2000) and Boone et al. (2004) applied the model to different manufacturing industries. 
Since measurement errors —including unobserved country or industry specific factors— are 
less likely to vary over time than across industries, the time series interpretation of beta 
                                                                          
7. The few existing empirical studies based on the Boone indicator have all used a log linear relationship. See, for 
example, Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2007). 
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is probably more robust than the cross-sector one (that is, comparison of β for various 
countries or industries at a specific moment in time). Therefore, Boone focuses mainly on the 
change in βt over time within a given industry, rather than comparing β between industries. 
 Because marginal costs cannot be observed directly, CPB (2000) and Boone 
et al. (2004) approximate a firm’s marginal costs by the ratio of average variable costs 
and revenues. As dependent variable in Equation (4), CPB (2000) uses the relative values of 
profits and as explanatory variable the ratio of variable costs and revenues, whereas 
Boone et al. (2004) consider absolute instead of relative values. 
 We improve on Boone’s approach in two ways. First, we calculate marginal costs 
instead of approximating this variable with average variable costs. We are able to do so 
by using a translog cost function, which is more precise and more closely in line with theory. 
An important advantage is that these marginal costs allow focussing on segments of 
the market, such as the loan market, where no direct observations of individual cost items are 
available. Second, we use market share as dependent variable instead of profits. The latter is, 
by definition, the product of market shares and profit margin. We have views on the impact of 
efficiency on market share and its relation with competition, supported by the theoretical 
framework above, whereas we have no a priori knowledge about the effect of efficiency on the 
profit margin. Hence, a market share model will be more precise. An even greater advantage of 
using market shares is that they are always positive, whereas the range of profits (or losses) 
includes negative values. A log linear specification would exclude negative profits (losses) by 
definition, so that the estimation results would be distorted by sample bias, because inefficient, 
loss-making banks would have to be ignored. 
 In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we first estimate, for each country, 
a translog cost function (TCF) using individual bank observations. Such a function assumes 
that the technology of an individual bank can be described by one multiproduct 
production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from such 
a production function, using output levels and factor prices as arguments. A TCF is a 
second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a generic dual cost function with all 
variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has proven to be an 
effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. The TCF has the following form: 
 
ln cith = α0 + ∑h=1,..,(H-1) αh dih + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) δt dt + ∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K βjh ln xijt dih 
             +∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K ∑k=1,..,K γjkh ln xijt ln xikt dih + vit 
 (5) 
 
where the dependent variable cith reflects the production costs of bank i (i = 1, .., N) in year 
t (t = 1, .., T). The sub-index h (h = 1, .., H) refers to the type category of the bank, that is, 
commercial bank, savings bank or cooperative bank. The variable dih is a dummy variable, 
which is 1 if bank i is of type h and otherwise zero. The variable dt is a dummy variable, which 
is 1 in year t and otherwise zero. The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of 
variables (k = 1, .., K). The first group consists of (K1) bank output components, such as loans, 
securities and other services (proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K2) input 
prices, such as wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses 
(proxied as the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K-K1-K2) 
control variables (also called ‘netputs’), e.g. the equity ratio. In line with Berger and 
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Mester (1997), the equity ratio corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks. 
The coefficients αh, βjh and γjkh, all vary with h, the bank type. The parameters δt are the 
coefficients of the time dummies and vit is the error term. 
 Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity in the input prices 
and cost-exhaustion [see e.g. Beattie and Taylor (1985), and Jorgenson (1986)]. They imply 
the following restrictions on the parameters, assuming —without loss of generality— that the 
indices j and k of the two sum terms in Equation (5) are equal to 1, 2 or 3, respectively, 
for wages, funding rates and prices of other expenses (disregarding the sub-index h): 
 
β1 + β2 + β3 = 1, γ1,k + γ2,k + γ3,k = 0 for k = 1, 2, 3, and γk,1 + γk,2 + γk,3 = 0 for k = 4,.., K  (6) 
 
The first restriction stems from cost exhaustion, reflecting the fact that the sum of cost 
shares is equal to unity. In other words, the value of the three inputs is equal to total costs. 
Linear homogeneity in the input prices requires that the three linear input price elasticities (βi) 
add up to 1, whereas the squared and cross terms of all explanatory variables (γi,j) add up to 
zero. Again without loss of generality, we also apply the symmetry restrictions γj,k = γk,j for j, 
k = 1, .., K.8 As Equation (5) expresses that we assume different cost functions for each type of 
bank, the restrictions (6) apply to each type of bank. 
 The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, 
mcilth are defined as: 
 
mci1th = ∂ cith / ∂ xi1t = (cith / xi1t) ∂ ln cith / ∂ ln xilt  (7) 
 
The term ∂ ln cith / ∂ ln xilt is the first derivative of Equation (5) of costs to loans. We use 
the marginal costs of the output component ‘loans’ only (and not for the other K1 components) 
as we investigate the loan markets. We estimate a separate translog cost function for each 
individual sector in each individual country, allowing for differences in the production structure 
across bank types within a country. This leads to the following equation of the marginal costs 
for output category loans (l) for bank i in category h during year t: 
 
mci1th = cith / xi1t (β1h + 2 γ1lh  ln xilt + ∑k=1,..,K; k ≠ l γ1kh ln xikt ) dih  (8) 
                                                                          
8. The restrictions are imposed on Equation (5) so that the equation is reformulated in terms of a lower number of 
parameters (see the appendix). 
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4 The data 
This paper uses an extended Bankscope database of banks’ balance sheet data running from 
1992 to 2004. We investigate banking markets of the major euro area countries, i.e. France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, as well as, for comparison, the UK, the US and 
Japan. The focus is on commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and mortgage 
banks and, for most countries, ignores specialized banks, such as investment banks, securities 
firms and specialized governmental credit institutions. For Germany, some specialized 
governmental credit institutions, that is, the major Landesbanks, are included in the sample in 
order to have a more adequate coverage of the German banking system. In addition to certain 
public finance duties, these Landesbanks also offer banking activities in competition with the 
private sector banks [Hackethal (2004)]. For Japan, in contrast with Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), 
we also include three long-term credit banks, because they traditionally have been offering 
long-term loans to the corporate sector and have increasingly become competitors of the 
commercial banks, due to the ongoing process of financial liberalisation in Japan which 
has eroded the traditional segmentation of the Japanese banking sector [Van Rixtel (2002)]. 
In order to exclude irrelevant and unreliable observations, banks are incorporated 
in our sample only if they fulfilled the following conditions: total assets, loans, deposits, equity 
and other non-interest income should be positive; the deposits-to-assets ratio and 
loans-to-assets ratio should be less than, respectively, 0.98 and 1; the income-to-assets ratio 
should be below 20 percent; personnel expenses-to-assets and other expenses-to-assets 
ratios should be between 0.05% and 5%; and finally, the equity-to-assets ratio should be 
between 1% and 50%. These restrictions reduced the sample by 3,980 observations mainly 
due to the equity-to-assets ratio restriction. As the Japanese banking sector experienced 
a deep crisis during most of our sample period, we have relaxed the equity ratio restriction for 
Japanese banks. 
 
Table 4.1. Number of banks by country and by type in 2002 
Country 
Commercial 
banks 
Cooperative 
banks 
Long-term 
credit 
banks 
Real estate 
banks/ 
Mortgage 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Special 
governmental 
credit 
institutions  Total 
DE 130 867 0 44 501 28 1,570 
ES 61 17 0 0 43 0 121 
FR 115 83 0 2 30 0 230 
UK 80 0 0 57 3 0 140 
IT 105 476 0 1 52 0 634 
JP 169 676 3 0 1 0 849 
NL 24 1 0 4 1 0 30 
US 7,921 1 0 1 914 0 8,837 
Total 8,605 2,121 3 109 1,545 28 12,411 
  
As a result, the data set for 2002 totals 8,605 commercial banks (including Landesbanks), 
2,121 cooperative banks, 1,545 savings banks and 109 mortgage banks, plus 31 other banks, 
which are 12,411 banks in total (see Table 4.1). Over all years of the sample, the number of 
observations is 88,647. German and, particularly, US banks dominate the sample with, 
respectively, 1,570 and 8,837 banks (in 2002). Before 1999, the number of US banks is only 
around one quarter of this number. 
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Table 4.2 gives a short description of the variables used in the estimations, such as 
costs, loans, securities and other services, each expressed as a share of total assets, income 
or funding. Costs are defined as the sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other 
non-interest expenses. Costs, loans and securities are, respectively, 6%, 61% and 25% of 
total assets. Average market shares differ strongly across countries, due mainly to country 
size effects. The output factor other services is proxied by non-interest income, which is 
around 12% of total income. Wage rates are proxied by personnel expenses as ratio of 
total assets, as for most banks the number of staff is not available. Wages average 1.5% 
of total assets. The other-expenses-to-fixed-assets ratio provides an input price for this input 
factor. Finally, interest rate costs, proxied by the ratio of interest expenses and total funding, 
run to around 3.1%. 
 
Table 4.2. Mean values of key variables by countries for the period 1992-2004 (in %) 
Country 
Total 
costs as 
a share 
of total 
assets  
Average 
market 
share of 
lending  
Loans as 
a share 
of total 
assets  
Securities 
as a share 
of total 
assets  
Other 
services as 
a share of 
total 
income  
Other 
expenses 
as a share 
of fixed 
assets 
Wages as a 
share of 
total assets 
Interest 
expenses 
as a share 
of total 
funding 
DE 6.44 0.06 60 22 12 227 1.5 3.7
ES 6.63 0.98 58 14 16 167 1.5 4.1
FR 7.42 0.41 54 4 20 537 1.5 4.8
UK 6.29 0.78 59 11 14 885 0.9 5.1
IT 6.67 0.22 53 26 16 261 1.7 3.5
JP 2.89 0.25 58 20 14 128 0.1 0.4
NL 6.59 0.54 54 15 13 340 0.9 5.4
US 5.63 0.01 63 28 11 148 1.6 2.8
Total 5.82 0.12 61 25 12 203 1.5 3.1
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5 Estimation results 
5.1 Marginal costs 
The first step of our estimation procedure is to calculate the marginal costs of the national 
banking sectors, that is, we estimate Equation (8) for each of the respective eight countries. 
For this purpose, we use the explanatory variables described in Section 4, namely 
bank outputs (loans, securities and other services), input prices (wages, funding rates and 
prices of other non-interest expenses) and the control variable (equity ratio). As an example, 
Table A.1 in the appendix presents the translog cost function for Germany.9 
The development of the marginal costs of loans for all individual countries during our 
sample period is shown in Table 5.1. It is clear that these costs have gradually declined 
over time, which to a large extent reflects the decrease in funding rates during 1992-2004. 
However, the speed and magnitude of this decline differ across countries. Thus, differences in 
country specific characteristics, such as banking technology or differences in legislation 
and supervision play a role in the development of marginal costs. Germany and Spain have 
relatively high marginal costs compared to the Netherlands, which may be related to population 
density. A low population density may raise operating costs in relative terms, because it makes 
the retail distribution of banking services relatively more costly. Table 5.1 also shows that 
marginal costs in France are the highest of all countries during the second half of our sample 
period. 
 
Table 5.1. Marginal costs of loans over time, weighted by loans (in % of loans) 1) 
Year/country DE ES FR UK IT JP NL US Average 
1992 10.2 15.9 13.8 14.5 13.2 6.0 9.2 – 10.9 
1993 9.4 17.2 13.4 11.3 12.0 5.4 8.1 – 9.8 
1994 9.2 14.3 11.9 9.8 12.2 5.4 7.4 – 9.1 
1995 8.9 15.4 11.7 10.2 11.8 5.6 7.1 – 9.3 
1996 8.5 14.3 10.9 9.2 11.3 4.5 6.3 – 8.8 
1997 7.4 11.7 10.9 9.0 9.7 5.0 6.4 – 8.2 
1998 7.1 11.1 11.2 10.3 7.5 5.1 7.4 – 7.9 
1999 6.4 8.8 10.0 7.7 6.7 4.0 6.4 6.8 6.8 
2000 7.1 9.9 11.2 8.0 6.7 3.0 6.5 7.4 7.3 
2001 7.3 9.6 11.7 7.2 6.6 3.2 6.4 6.9 7.6 
2002 7.1 7.8 10.7 6.3 6.1 3.1 5.7 5.6 6.7 
2003 6.4 5.9 8.9 5.8 5.3 2.8 4.9 4.9 5.9 
2004 6.0 4.8 7.9 5.6 4.9 2.7 4.6 4.5 5.4 
   
1) Marginal costs are first calculated with Equation (8) at the individual bank level. Next, the numbers 
are weighted by the amount of loans on the balance sheet and aggregated by country and by year. 
 
 
Table 5.2 shows that commercial banks in general have higher marginal costs than 
savings and cooperative banks. A possible explanation is that these banks attract fewer 
deposits and therefore have higher funding costs. 
 
                                                                          
9. The translog cost functions for the other countries may be obtained from the authors. 
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Table 5.2. Marginal costs by country and by bank type in 2002 
(in % of loans) 1) 
Country Commercial banks Savings banks Cooperative banks 
DE   7.14 5.80   6.13 
ES 10.12 4.67   4.96 
FR 10.31 6.89 11.52 
UK   4.94 9.63      – 
IT   6.64 4.28   4.77 
JP   1.95 0.56   3.15 
NL   6.52     –   3.83 
US   5.71 4.78      – 
  
1) Marginal costs are first calculated with Equation (8) at the individual bank level. 
Next,the numbers are weighted by the amount of loans on the balance sheet 
and aggregated by country, by year and by bank type. 
 
 
5.2 The Boone indicator 
Given the estimated marginal costs from the previous section, we are now able to estimate the 
Boone indicator. To do so, we use for each country the relationship between the marginal 
costs of individual banks and their market shares as in Equation (4):10 
 
ln silt = α + β ln mcilt + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) γt dt + uilt  (9) 
 
where s stands for market share, mc for marginal costs, i refers to bank i, l to output type 
‘loans’, and t to year t; dt are time dummies [as in Equation (5)] and μilt is the error term. 
This provides us with the coefficient β, the Boone indicator. We estimate this equation for, 
respectively, the overall banking sector in each country (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) and for the 
various banking categories separately: commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks 
and mortgage banks (Section 5.2.3). We present country estimates of β both for the entire 
period, referred to as full sample period estimates, and for each year separately, referred to as 
annual estimates. 
The estimations are carried out using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with 
as instrument variables the one-, two- or three-year lagged values of the explanatory variable, 
marginal costs.11 To test for overidentification of the instruments, we apply the Hansen J-test 
for GMM [Hayashi (2000)]. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is 
chi-squared with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentification 
restrictions. A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. Further, the 
Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio is used to test for the relevance of excluded 
instrument variables [Hayashi (2000)]. The null hypothesis of this test is that the matrix of 
reduced form coefficients has rank K-1, where K is the number of regressors, meaning 
that the equation is underidentified. Under the null hypothesis of underidentification, the 
statistic is chi-squared distributed with L-K+1 degrees of freedom, where L is the number of 
                                                                          
10. As bank types do not play any role here, we do not refer to the index h [compare to Equation (11)]. 
11. For Germany, the one-, two- or three-year lagged values of the average costs are used.  
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instruments (whether included in the equation or excluded). This statistic provides a measure 
of instrument relevance, and rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is 
identified. We use kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance 
estimations. The bandwidth in the estimation is set at two periods and the Newey-West 
kernel is applied. Where the instruments are overidentified, 2SLS is used instead of GMM. 
For this 2SLS estimator, Sargan's statistic is used instead of the Hansen J-test. 
5.2.1 DEGREE OF COMPETITION ACROSS COUNTRIES 
This section discusses the full sample period estimates of the Boone indicator. The results 
in Table 5.3 suggest that competition in the bank loan market varies considerably across 
countries.12 The full sample period estimates are derived by estimating one single β for 
the entire period, as in Equation (9), instead of estimating a β for each year. These full sample 
period estimates can be interpreted as averages of the year-to-year estimates over the 
entire 1994-2004 period, weighted by the number of observations in each year. The lagged 
instrument variables cover the 1992-2004 period. According to the full sample period 
estimates, the loan market in the euro area is less competitive than the US market. Note that 
the sample period for the US covers only the last five years, which may distort a comparison 
with the other countries. Competition in the euro area appears relatively strong compared 
to the UK and Japan. Japanese banks are less competitive, with, in absolute terms, a lowest 
β of -0.72. 
Among the major countries in the euro area, the Boone indicator for Spain, Italy 
and Germany suggest comparatively competitive banking markets, while the Dutch banking 
sector takes up an intermediate position. Within the euro area, France has the least 
competitive banking market. These findings differ somewhat from recent empirical evidence 
from alternative measures of competition applied to the European banking sector, such as 
concentration and price-based measures. For example, recent findings by Carbó et al. (2006) 
suggest that on average, banking competition seems to be strong in the UK, followed by the 
Netherlands and France, while most measures they use suggest a lower degree of competition 
in Spain, Italy and Germany.13 At the same time, Carbó et al. (2006) find that in general the 
correlation between the various competition measures is relatively weak. Moreover, 
they suggest that there is ‘… little relationship between structural and non-structural 
(i.e. price-based) measures of banking competition’. As mentioned in Section 3, the information 
on the degree of competition provided by the Boone indicator, on the one hand, and by 
price-based and concentration-based measures of competition, on the other hand, may differ, 
as the Boone indicator lacks some of the weaknesses of the latter measures which we 
identified in Section 3. So it is not surprising if the results of Carbó et al. (2006) differ from ours. 
We compare our estimates of the full-sample period Boone indicator with the HHI statistic and 
find a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.30. This suggests that a higher number of banks 
(or lower concentration) correlates positively, be it weakly, with a larger (negative) value, 
in absolute terms, of the Boone indicator (indicating stronger competition). 
Contrary to recent criticism on the functioning of the German banking sector 
[e.g. IMF (2004)], our estimates suggest that this sector is among the most competitive in 
the euro area. Most likely, this result for Germany hinges in part on the special structure 
                                                                          
12. In order to test the robustness of the model specification, we re-estimated β with a linear model instead of a 
log-linear one. The changes are limited. For instance, the German coefficient shifts from -3.38 to -2.68. 
13. The estimated competition measures in Carbó et al. (2006) include the net interest margin, the return on assets ratio, 
the Lerner index, H-statistics and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index. The sample applied by Carbó et al. (2006) is broadly 
similar to ours, although the number of banks in their study is somewhat smaller. 
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of its banking system, being built on three pillars, namely commercial banks, publicly-owned 
savings banks and cooperative banks [see Hackethal (2004)]. Contrary to most other euro 
area countries, the total market share of the commercial banks in the loan and deposit markets 
is relatively limited, amounting to a mere 20-30%. Thus, this distinct characteristic of the 
German banking system may partly explain why competition is found to be strongest 
in this country, since the Boone indicator is based on the relationship between banks’ 
relative marginal costs (which in Germany, as in most countries, were found to be lower for the 
non-commercial banks than for the commercial banks) and their market share (which is 
larger for the non-commercial banks in Germany than for those in other countries). Hence, 
our results should not be seen as contradicting the concerns of the IMF [see IMF (2004)] about 
the inflexibility and distortive effects of the so-called three-pillar system in Germany, but rather 
as reflecting the structural characteristics discussed above (see also Section 5.2.3). The Boone 
indicator for Germany may rather reflect the competitive environment of the commercial 
banking sector, which operates countrywide, than the competitiveness of the savings and 
cooperative banks that, generally, are active in regional markets only. 
 
Table 5.3. Estimates of the Boone indicator over 1994-2004 
for various countries 
1) Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence.  
2) The z-value indicates whether the parameter significantly differs from 0 under the normal distribution with zero 
mean and standard deviation one.  
3) For Germany and the US, 2SLS is used and the equation is exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test 
statistic is 0. 
 
The results for Spain and Italy seem to be driven mainly by the boost to competition 
following the deregulation and liberalisation of the banking sector in the two countries in the 
early 1990s.14 In the Netherlands, the banking sector went through a process of profound 
reorganisation and consolidation during the 1980s and 1990s.15 This development increased 
concentration in the Dutch banking sector, but may also have led to efficiency improvements. 
All in all, the Boone indicator suggests that from an international perspective competitive 
conditions in the Dutch banking sector take up an intermediate position.16 Finally, the French 
banking sector is found to be the least competitive of the euro area countries considered. This 
finding may in part stem from the fact that although most French banks have now been 
privatized and the government continues its withdrawal from the banking industry, the role 
                                                                          
14. See for example S&P (2004) and Moody’s Investors Service (2006). Our results are in line with Maudos et al. (2002), 
who find that profit margins during that decade declined significantly in Spain, especially for commercial banks and, to 
a lesser extent, for saving banks. For Italy, Coccorese (2005) presents evidence for the largest eight Italian banks 
during 1988-2000 that despite increased concentration the degree of competition remained considerable. 
15. See for example Moody’s Investors Service (2005a). 
16. Our results are in line with other empirical investigations, such as on competition in the Dutch market for revolving 
consumer credit, which showed that this market is competitive indeed [see Toolsema (2002)]. 
 
 Boone 
indicator1) z-value2) F-test 
Anderson canon. 
corr. LR-test 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
Number of 
observations 
DE3) **-3.38 -10.80 18.03 930.7 0.00 14,534 
ES **-4.15 -3.99 2.87 162.7 1.339 (0.25) 734 
FR **-0.90 -4.89 7.98 1,122.7 1.816 (0.18) 936 
IT **-3.71 -7.77 19.16 1,613.6 1.690 (0.19) 3,419 
NL **-1.56 -3.46 2.59 159.2 1.106 (0.29) 197 
UK **-1.05 -3.12 1.50 1,068.4 0.396 (0.52) 787 
US3) **-5.41 -40.49 345.04 9,916.0 0.00 40,177 
JP *-0.72 -2.26 14.08 402.1 4.88 (0.03) 1,423 
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of the State in the French banking sector remains non-negligible, in that some important 
entities remain State-controlled [see for example: Fitch Ratings (2001); Moody’s Investors 
Service (2004); S&P (2005b)]. 
Turning to the non-euro area countries, the Boone indicator suggests that in the UK, 
competition in the loan market is weak. This may be because in specific segments of 
the UK loan market, in particular mortgage lending, other institutions play an important role.17 
Our results are in line with Drake and Simper (2003) who find that due to the change in 
the ownership structure of building societies (‘de-mutualisation’) competition in retail banking 
activities in the UK declined during 1999-2001. As a matter of fact, the Boone indicator for 
the loan market without the real estate and mortgage banks shows that competition in this 
segment is significantly stronger.18 
The US banking sector appears to be the most competitive among the countries in 
our sample, reflecting the significant changes in the US banking system over the past two 
decades. While it remains largely bifurcated along metropolitan and rural lines and continues 
to hinge on the principles of specialisation and regionalism (basically stemming from legislation 
enacted following the Great Depression), especially the lifting of restrictions on the range of 
banking activities and of the ban on interstate banking have transformed the US banking 
system.19 
Finally, the poor result for Japan is largely driven by the regulation of the banking 
industry during the 1990s. As will be shown in the next section, however, competition in the 
Japanese loan market increased dramatically during the period under investigation. 
This section’s estimates, based on the entire sample period, may conceal 
considerable differences over time and across types of banks. We investigate developments 
in the level of competition over time in the next section and differences across types of banks in 
Section 5.2.3. 
5.2.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPETITION OVER THE YEARS 
Table 5.4 shows the estimates of the Boone indicator across countries and over time 
(usually 1994-2004, depending on the respective country), based on: 
 
ln silt = α + ∑t=1,..,T βt dt ln mcilt + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) γt dt + uilt 
 (10) 
Note that, in this section, the indicator βt is time dependent. While the above 
conclusions based on the full sample period estimates generally remain valid, there 
are some notable differences across countries in the Boone indicator’s development 
during the sample period. In most countries, not all the βt’s differ significantly from zero for 
all years. Only for the US, the betas differ from zero for all years. For Spain and the 
Netherlands, we observe substantial jumps in the series over time (see also Chart 5.1). 
                                                                          
17. The UK has over 100 mortgage lenders. See also Moody’s Investors Service (2005c). 
18. According to Heffernan (2002), the mortgage market in the UK is relatively competitive, but in other market segments 
such as personal loans there is substantially less competition. Results for the UK of estimations using a sample in which 
the mortgage lenders are excluded can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
19. See for overviews of the various legislative changes for example Cetorelli (2001), Clarke (2004) and Fitch 
Ratings (2005). Emmons and Schmid (2000) find evidence that even before most of this new legislation was enacted, 
banks and credit unions competed directly. 
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However, generally, the estimated successive annual betas do not differ significantly from 
each other.20 Finally, for Japan (for six years), France (for 2 years) and the Netherlands 
and the UK (for one year), the value of βt is positive instead of, as expected, negative, in line 
with the rationale of Equation (4).21 This paragraph discusses only the countries with statistically 
significant changes over time: Italy, the US and Japan.22 Chart 5.1 shows the results for the 
other countries. 
The banking sector in Italy, particularly the savings banks, went through a process of 
deregulation and liberalisation in the early 1990s, fuelled in part by the adoption of various 
EU Directives on financial institutions, which led to a consolidation wave.23 Whereas the EU 
legislative initiatives affected all EU banking sectors, their eventual impact on competition was 
most probably driven by the actual implementation at the national level and by additional 
country-specific initiatives. In Italy, in particular, these institutional and regulatory changes 
are likely to have had a catalytic effect on competition, as our estimates suggest strong 
competition around the mid-1990s [see Coccorese (2005); Gambacorta and Iannotti (2005)]. 
In more recent years, the new banking groups formed in the early 1990s may have been able 
to reconstitute some market power, as our results point to a continuous decline in competition 
since 1997 (see also Chart 5.2).24 
 Although our estimates of the Boone indicator for the US show a significantly 
increasing trend (indicating a decline in competition),25 the level of competition remains 
comparatively high. A possible explanation for this gradual decline of competition is the 
decrease in market share of commercial banks, which are generally more competitive than 
savings banks, as will be shown in Section 5.2.3 [see also Jones and Critchfield (2005)]. 
In Japan, competition seems to have improved significantly (see Chart 5.3). 
This remarkable increase can be partly attributed to a history of no or very little competition 
in the mid-1990s. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no change at 1% for 
Japan. In particular, our estimates show that the Japanese banking sector experienced 
a rather marked transformation from a climate with very little competition in the mid-1990s 
to a more competitive environment in recent years, to where Japan ranked second in 2004, 
behind the US. This partly reflects the process of financial deregulation and the gradual 
resolution of the bad loan problems that plagued Japanese banks throughout the 1990s 
[Van Rixtel (2002)]. Eventually, this development involved the de-facto nationalisation 
of the worst-performing institutions and a major wave of consolidations, resulting in the 
establishment of a small number of large commercial banking groups in 2000 and 2001 
[Van Rixtel et al. (2004)]. Our estimates suggest that the profound and structural changes in the 
Japanese banking sector have helped to foster a competitive environment. 
                                                                          
20. In this paper, ‘significant’ refers to the 95% level of confidence all along. 
21. An alternative explanation is that competition on quality may lead to both higher marginal costs and higher market 
shares. 
22. For these countries a Wald test with an H0 hypothesis of no change over time was rejected at the 5% level of 
significance.  
23. In the early 1990s, large universal banking groups were established in Italy, as various restrictions on business 
activities were abolished. See for example Fitch Ratings (2002b), Moody’s Investors Service (2005d) and S&P (2005a). 
The process of financial deregulation was partly affected via Community legislation such as the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive; see Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and Cetorelli (2004). A largely similar development took place in 
Spain, where important mergers involving the largest commercial banks took place in 1999 and 2000. See, for example, 
Fitch Ratings (2002a). 
24. In 2005 and 2006, a new wave of consolidation in the Italian banking sector was initiated. However, as our sample 
ends in 2004, our results do not capture these events. 
25. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no change at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 5.4. Development of the Boone indicator over time for various countries2) 
Notes: Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence. Coefficients of time dummies have not been shown. 
1) Equation (10) is estimated with GMM. The number of observations for Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK is 
higher than in Table 5.3, due to the use of instrumental variables with lags of a higher order in Table 5.3. 
2) 2SLS is used and the equation is exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test is 0. 
 
   Germany1)  France  Italy1)  
The Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value βt z-value 
1993     -5.90 -1.18 
1994     **-7.25 -3.24 
1995 -4.47. -1.40 **-1.28 -3.36 **-4.51 -3.53 
1996 **-7.09 -2.92 **-1.28 -3.56 **-5.58 -3.98 
1997 **-4.64 -3.41 **-1.11 -3.55 **-5.89 -4.08 
1998 **-5.10 -3.97 *-0.79. -1.99 **-4.60 -6.08 
1999 **-2.60 -4.04 *-0.78 -2.30 **-4.05 -4.39 
2000 **-2.50 -4.60 -0.46. -1.34 **-3.32 -4.39 
2001 **-3.31 -7.02 -0.68. -1.67 **-2.66 -3.62 
2002 **-4.53 -4.71 -0.40. -0.78 -1.59. -1.82 
2003 **-2.73 -5.62  0.27.  0.39 **-2.42 -3.69 
2004 **-2.66 -4.15  0.10.  0.12 **-1.81 -2.79 
F-test 10.70  5.10  13.23  
Anderson canon corr. 
LR-test 185.2  1,023.7  300.3  
Hansen J-test 0.00  19.69 (0.48)  0.00  
Number of observations 14,534  918  4,918  
        
   Spain1)  Netherlands US1)  
The Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value βt z-value 
1993 *-4.21 -2.49     
1994 *-4.80 -2.28 -1.92 -1.42   
1995 -5.20 -1.92 *-4.42 -2.42   
1996 -9.61 -0.67 **-2.09 -2.58   
1997 -4.36 -1.78 -3.57 -1.70   
1998 -5.40 -0.86  1.04  0.38   
1999 *-5.46 -2.21 -1.44 -0.85   
2000 -3.44 -1.93 **-3.26 -3.00 **-6.89 -20.34 
2001 **-4.38 -2.55 **-3.91 -4.71 **-6.16 -20.94 
2002 *-3.88 -2.09 *-2.45 -2.44 **-5.54 -22.61 
2003 -3.42 -1.20 -2.22 -1.80 **-4.87 -22.15 
2004 **-2.69 -5.62 **-3.09 -2.85 **-4.54 -25.53 
F-test   3.33  3.90  198.30 
Anderson canon corr. 
LR-test 38.8  31.7  7,084.3  
Hansen J-test 0.00   20.5 (0.04)  0.00  
Number of observations 1,015  241  40,177  
       
 
   United Kingdom Japan  
The Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value   
1994  0.36  0.55     
1995 -0.95 -1.57 **7.30  4.93   
1996 -0.48 -0.64 **13.88  6.63   
1997 -1.33 -1.52 **5.98  3.97   
1998 *-1.87 -2.17 **3.97  4.04   
1999 *-1.52 -1.96 **4.85  2.58   
2000 *-1.56 -2.05  0.11  0.03   
2001 *-1.46 -1.97 **-2.52 -4.04   
2002 -1.22 -1.65 **-2.63 -3.73   
2003 -0.43 -0.66 **-2.90 -6.56   
2004 -0.49 -0.93 **-3.63 -5.95   
F-test 1.25  23.48    
Anderson canon corr. 
LR-test 1,468.2  214.8  
  
Hansen J-test, (p-value) 20.88 (0.03)  34.43 (0.02)    
Number of observations 912  1,476    
 
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0736 
 
 
Chart 5.1. Indicators of the countries with no significant change 
in competition over time 
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Chart 5.2. Indicators of the countries with significantly diminishing 
competition over time 
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Chart 5.3. The indicator of the country with significantly improving 
competition over time 
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5.2.3 COMPETITION IN THE SEPARATE BANK CATEGORIES 
Possibly, banks in some countries compete mainly with other banks in the same category, 
rather than with all the other banks. It is conceivable that small cooperative and savings banks 
offer mainly traditional bank products to retail customers and to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, whereas the large commercial banks serve mainly larger firms and wealthy 
individuals in need of a diversified palette of advanced services. In such countries, competition 
estimates for separate bank categories may be more accurate than estimates based on all 
banks. Therefore, this section estimates separate Boone indicators for commercial banks, 
savings banks and cooperative banks, for all countries, except the Netherlands and the UK, 
based on: 
 
ln silth = αh + ∑t=1,..,T βth ln mcilth + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) γth dth + uilth (11) 
 
The banking sectors in the latter markets show only minor segmentation, so that 
estimating indicators for specific bank categories seems irrelevant. For Germany we consider, 
on the one hand, commercial banks and Landesbanks, which are assumed to compete 
with each other, and on the other, cooperative banks and small savings banks, as they 
compete in local markets only [see Hackethal (2004)]. In Italy, competition is estimated 
separately for the three bank types considered. Some cooperative banks, e.g. the banche 
populari, operate on a local level, whereas the banche di credito cooperative (BCC) 
operate on a regional to national level, competing more directly with the commercial banks 
[Fitch Ratings (2002b)]. The sample of cooperative banks is dominated by the BCCs, which 
also explains the fact that the level of competition is closely in line with that of the Italian 
commercial banks. For the other countries, cooperative banks and savings banks are bundled 
together, as they behave quite similarly. The results are presented in Table 5.5. 
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Particularly in Germany and the US, competition is found to be stronger among 
commercial banks than among cooperative and savings banks. In Italy, commercial banks are 
found to be more competitive than the savings banks for most of the period.26 These findings 
may be explained by the fact that traditionally, savings banks and cooperative banks 
tend to operate at the local level and have access to a stable and cheap pool of deposits 
from a loyal customer base. Furthermore, savings and cooperative banks are often partly 
protected from competition, being unable (either through regulation or by tradition) to compete 
across regional borders.27 Commercial banks are typically larger and operate on a national 
(or at least supra-regional) level, where they face competition from other regional and foreign 
banks. Lacking easy access to a stable pool of deposits, they depend more on costly interbank 
and market-based funding. They provide loans and services predominantly to larger 
corporate customers and face competition from the capital markets. These factors may 
induce commercial banks to behave more competitively than the protected savings and 
cooperative banks.28 
In France, the estimated degrees of competition among commercial banks and 
among other banks are similar. This may be due to a considerable degree of consolidation 
across the different banking sectors. Possibly, our results may be explained by this lack of 
effective or de facto segmentation. However, the results for both the commercial banks and the 
other banks are only significant for a limited number of years, and so should be interpreted 
carefully. In the case of Spain, none of the yearly estimates for the category of savings 
and cooperative banks is significant. As a matter of fact, it may be doubted whether segment 
specific estimation makes sense for Spain, as savings banks, which dominate the other banks 
category, are seen to compete at the national level with commercial banks, rather than at the 
regional or local level.29 
 Results for Japan indicate that the savings and cooperative banks there have 
generally been more competitive than the commercial banks. This result may reflect the fact 
that savings and cooperative banks were much less exposed to the collapse of the Japanese 
‘bubble’ economy, with its inflated real estate and other asset prices, than the large 
commercial banks (including long-term credit and trust banks). The latter, being more strongly 
exposed to the real estate sector, bore the brunt of this collapse [Van Rixtel (2002)]. 
The substantial government support commercial banks received in order to avoid bankruptcy 
distorted competition. 
                                                                          
26. The finding that the cooperative banks in Italy are highly competitive (compared to the commercial and savings 
banks) are surprising, as the Italian cooperative banking sector traditionally has been dominated by a large number of 
small banks that have a solid franchise in the local market benefiting from strong customer loyalty. However, as is 
reported in Fitch Ratings (2002b), the cooperative sector has seen strong rationalisation, with the remaining cooperative 
banks falling into two categories: a small group of larger multi-regional cooperative banks and a group of small 
cooperative banks serving their home regions. This process may actually have been beneficial to competition. 
27. This is the case in Germany through the so-called Regionalprinzip, or principle of market demarcation within the 
banking groups [see e.g. Fischer and Pfeil (2004); Fischer and Hempel (2005)]. In Italy and the US restrictions 
to cross-regional competition were effectively lifted during the 1990s, although in practice the majority of the local banks 
continue to operate predominantly within their historical regional borders. 
28. Furthermore, in Germany these competitive features may be further amplified by the existence of the three-pillar 
system, which hinders consolidation across the three bank types [see Fischer and Pfeil (2004); IMF (2005)]. 
29. Crespí et al. (2004) find that competition in retail banking in Spain, including both commercial and savings banks, 
remains high. 
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Table 5.5. Segmented markets in Germany, Italy, France, 
Spain, Japan and the US 
Germany   
Commercial banks and 
Landesbanken 
Cooperative banks and 
savings banks 
 
Boone indicator βt z-value βt z-value   
1995 *-3.01 -2.44  0.52  0.39   
1996 *-3.89 -2.12 **-1.94 -3.10   
1997 **-4.08 -2.69 **-1.92 -4.66   
1998 **-3.11 -3.23 **-2.08 -5.87   
1999 -2.54 -1.45 **-2.19 -6.34   
2000 *-3.61 -2.45 **-2.39 -9.21   
2001 **-6.09 -3.96 **-2.94 -8.48   
2002 -9.36 -1.65 **-3.41 -8.19   
2003 *6.06 -2.13 **-2.46 -8.19   
2004 **-5.41 -2.66 **-2.39 -7.34   
F-test 3.68  18.95    
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 56.6  719.7    
Hansen J-test 12.7 (0.24)  24.2 (0.01)    
Number of observations 849  11,097    
 
Italy   Commercial banks1) Savings banks1) Cooperative banks1) 
Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value βt z-value 
1993 -8.44 -0.60 -1.97 -0.55 -6.10  -1.51 
1994 -9.01 -1.46 -2.38 -1.66 **-8.08  -3.16 
1995 *-2.87 -2.00 -2.10 -1.43 **-9.54  -4.15 
1996 **-3.73 -2.68 -1.40 -0.98 **-5.73  -5.57 
1997 **-5.87 -2.80 -1.56 -1.05 **-5.53  -7.60 
1998 **-4.56 -3.17 -2.59 -1.70 **-4.41  -8.47 
1999 *-3.07 -2.42 *-1.91 -2.10 **-4.67 -10.27 
2000 **-2.59 -2.91 -0.78 -1.93 **-5.69 -11.05 
2001 *-1.69 -2.39 -1.43 -1.70 **-5.40  -9.13 
2002 *-0.95 -2.37 **-3.29 -3.36 **-4.95 -11.30 
2003 **-2.48 -3.20 **-3.60 -3.05 **-5.08 -11.84 
2004 *-1.77 -2.48 -2.84 -1.58 **-4.96  -8.45 
F-test 2.30  2.69  31.26  
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 28.55  70.5  1,425.7  
Hansen J-test 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Number of observations 1,010  608  3,296  
       
France Commercial banks Savings, cooperative and mortgage banks 
Boone indicator βt z-value βt z-value   
1995 **-1.45 -2.76 *-1.16 -2.10   
1996 **-1.82 -3.18 -0.65 -1.26   
1997 **-1.59 -2.98 -0.58 -1.58   
1998 -0.85 -0.99 -0.66 -1.59   
1999 -0.91 -1.39 **-0.87 -3.10   
2000  0.28  0.24 -0.61 -1.92   
2001 -0.43 -0.47 **-1.07 -3.19   
2002  0.52  0.47 -0.98 -1.80   
2003  0.63  0.61  1.06  1.87   
2004 -0.03 -0.02 *1.23  2.28   
F-test 2.48  4.91    
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 378.9  745.5    
Hansen J-test 25.763 (0.17)  7.83 (0.65)    
Number of observations 482  440    
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(cont.) Table 5.5. Segmented markets in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, 
Japan and the US 
Spain   Commercial banks1) Savings and cooperative banks1) 
Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value   
1993 **-4.10 -2.71  5.83  1.52   
1994 **-4.67 -2.61  9.57  1.43   
1995 -5.67 -1.90  3.82  1.11   
1996 -8.75 -0.67  2.42  0.94   
1997 -4.16 -1.76  1.38  0.38   
1998 -4.90 -0.85 -2.76 -1.11   
1999 *-5.10 -2.14  3.70  0.73   
2000 -3.15 -1.75  2.89  0.59   
2001 *-4.18 -2.48 -1.64 -0.37   
2002 *-3.29 -2.12 -3.97 -0.61   
2003 -2.96 -1.17 -3.49 -0.80   
2004 **-2.54 -4.86 -0.88 -0.28   
F-test 2.35  1.37    
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 22.8  21.8    
Hansen J-test 0.00  0.00    
Number of observations 525  486   
 
United States  Commercial banks1)  Savings banks1)   
Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value   
2000 -6.06** -19.44 -3.40** -5.63   
2001 -5.54** -21.17 -3.60** -7.14   
2002 -4.63** -24.22 -3.61** -8.41   
2003 -7.01** -19.81 -3.50** -6.15   
2004 -4.97** -20.90 -3.62** -6.62   
F-test 177.9  20.57    
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 6,541.4  1,175.8    
Hansen J-test 0.00  0.00    
Number of observations 36,229  3,939    
     
Japan   Commercial banks Savings banks and cooperative banks 
Boone indicator  βt z-value βt z-value   
1995  4.30  1.41  **1.44  4.07  
1996 **14.18  7.03  **2.43  2.56  
1997 ** 9.09  5.37  0.55  0.28  
1998  **3.68  3.87  *7.16  2.50  
1999  **5.82  6.81 -0.78 -0.87  
2000 **13.98  1.86 -1.26 -0.35  
2001 **-1.01 -11.40 **-3.14 -4.07  
2002 **-1.59 -13.56 **-3.42 -3.68  
2003 **-2.36 -19.94 **-3.63 -3.45  
2004 **-2.20 -15.50 **-3.69 -2.75  
F-test 127.55  93.90   
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 13.6  73.6   
Hansen J-test 6.863 (0.55)  22.25 (0.13)   
Number of observations 63  1,416   
  
Notes: Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence. Coefficients of time dummies have not been shown. 
1) 2SLS is used and the equation is thus exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test is 0.00. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper uses a new measure for competition, the Boone indicator, and is the first 
study that applies this approach to the banking markets. This indicator quantifies the impact 
of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of market shares. We improve 
the original Boone indicator by calculating marginal costs instead of approximating marginal 
costs by average variable costs. This approach has the advantage of being able to measure 
bank market segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of 
competition, such as the Panzar-Rosse method, consider only the entire banking market. 
Moreover, estimation of the Boone indicator requires relatively moderate amounts of data 
only. A disadvantage of the Boone-indicator is that it assumes that banks generally pass on at 
least part of their efficiency gains to their clients. Furthermore, like many other model-based 
measures, our approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as 
the attractiveness of innovations. Finally, as all model-based measures, the Boone indicator 
should only be regarded as an estimate. 
We apply the Boone indicator to the loan markets of the five major countries in the 
euro area and, for comparison, to the UK, the US and Japan over the 1994-2004 period. 
Our findings indicate that during this period the US had the most competitive loan market, 
whereas overall loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in 
the EU. The German results seem to be driven partly by a competitive commercial banking 
sector reflecting the distinct nature of its “three-pillar” banking system. In Spain, competition 
remained strong and relatively stable over the full sample period, indicating the progress the 
Spanish banking system has made since the major liberalisation reforms in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position among the countries 
in our sample, despite having a relatively concentrated banking market dominated by a small 
number of very large players. Italian competition declined significantly over time, which may 
be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the banking groups formed in the 
early 1990s. French and British loan markets were less competitive overall. In Japan, 
competition in loan markets was found to increase dramatically over the years, in line with 
the consolidation and revitalisation of the Japanese banking industry in recent years. 
Turning to competition among specific types of banks, we found that commercial 
banks, which are more exposed to competition from foreign banks and capital markets, tend to 
be more competitive, particularly in Germany and the US, than savings and cooperative banks, 
which typically operate in local markets. Competition among savings and cooperative banks in 
Japan was considerably stronger than competition between commercial banks. This may 
indicate the adverse impact of banking crises on bank competition, as the commercial banks 
were particularly hard-hit by the severe banking crisis that engulfed Japan during the 1990s. 
All in all, according to the Boone indicator, competitive conditions in the loan 
markets and their developments over time are found to differ considerably across countries. 
These differences seem largely to reflect distinct characteristics of the national banking 
sectors, such as the relative importance of commercial, cooperative and saving banks 
respectively, and changes to the banks’ institutional and regulatory environment during our 
sample period. 
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APPENDIX Estimations of the translog cost function 
 
Table A.1. Estimations of the translog cost function for Germany 
Dependent variable: ln(costs)-ln(other expenses) Coefficient t-value P>|t| 
Outputs    
ln(loans)_comm. banks  0.01  0.43 0.67 
(ln(loans))2_comm. banks   0.08 45.14 0.00 
ln(securities)_comm. banks  0.11  9.32 0.00 
(ln(securities))2_comm. banks  0.04 39.84 0.00 
ln(other services)_comm. banks  0.66 34.45 0.00 
(ln(other services))2_comm. banks  0.06 24.31 0.00 
ln(loans)_savings banks -0.55 -5.16 0.00 
(ln(loans))2_savings banks  0.21 20.25 0.00 
ln(securities)_savings banks  0.60 10.79 0.00 
(ln(securities))2_savings banks  0.05 24.39 0.00 
ln(other services)_savings banks  0.92  7.93 0.00 
(ln(other services))2_savings banks   0.07  5.73 0.00 
ln(loans)_coop. banks  0.19  6.02 0.00 
(ln(loans))2_coop. banks  0.11 26.79 0.00 
ln(securities)_coop. banks  0.42 27.56 0.00 
(ln(securities))2_coop. banks  0.04 42.97 0.00 
ln(other services)_coop. banks  0.42 14.93 0.00 
(ln(other services))2_coop. banks   0.05 13.86 0.00 
Input prices    
ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)_comm. banks -0.02 -0.78 0.44 
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))2_comm. banks  0.12 26.00 0.00 
ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)_comm. banks  0.85 28.35 0.00 
(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))2_comm. banks  0.15 22.66 0.00 
Ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)_savings banks  0.79  5.55 0.00 
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))2_savings banks  0.06  2.18 0.03 
ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)_savings banks  0.14  0.94 0.35 
(ln(funding rate) -ln(other expenses))2_savings banks  0.08  2.91 0.00 
ln(wage)-ln(other expenses)_coop. banks  0.15  4.16 0.00 
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))2_coop. banks  0.65 15.58 0.00 
ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses)_coop. banks  0.09 15.26 0.00 
(ln(funding rate) -ln(other expenses))2_coop. banks  0.10 12.40 0.00 
Cross-products between input prices    
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_ 
comm. banks 
-0.27 -26.54 0.00 
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other 
expenses))_savings banks 
-0.15  -2.84 0.01 
(ln(wage) -ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other 
expenses))_coop. banks 
-0.20 -14.82 0.00 
Cross-products between outputs    
ln(loans) * ln(securities)_comm. banks -0.03 -16.25 0.00 
ln(loans) * ln(other services)_comm. banks -0.10 -27.25 0.00 
ln(securities) * ln(other services)_comm. banks  -0.03 -15.70 0.00 
ln(loans) * ln(securities)_savings banks -0.21 -20.79 0.00 
ln(loans) * ln(other services)_savings banks -0.21 -10.44 0.00 
ln(securities) * ln(other services)_savings banks   0.08  7.58 0.00 
ln(loans) * ln(securities)_coop. banks -0.12 -34.04 0.00 
ln(loans) * ln(other services)_ coop. banks -0.10 -15.55 0.00 
ln(securities) * ln(other services)_coop. banks   0.03  9.17 0.00 
Cross-products between outputs and input prices    
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks  0.06 13.48 0.00 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks -0.04 -8.27 0.00 
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.00 -0.11 0.91 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.02  0.78 0.44 
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks  0.10 11.44 0.00 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks -0.08 -8.09 0.00  
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 (cont.) Table A.1. Estimations of the translog cost function for Germany  
Dependent variable: ln(costs)-ln(other expenses) Coefficient t-value P>|t| 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks -0.04 -8.27 0.00 
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.00 -0.11 0.91 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.02  0.78 0.44 
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks  0.10 11.44 0.00 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks -0.08 -8.09 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks  0.03 11.11 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks -0.04 -10.00 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks -0.10 -6.34 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.06  3.88 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks -0.06 -14.28 0.00 
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks  0.05 10.49 0.00 
ln(other services)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks -0.05 -9.36 0.00 
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_comm. banks  0.04  6.74 0.00 
ln(other services) *(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks  0.07  2.22 0.03 
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_savings banks -0.06 -1.89 0.06 
ln(other services)*(ln(wage)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks -0.04 -4.48 0.00 
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)-ln(other expenses))_coop. banks  0.03  2.79 0.01 
Control variables    
ln(equity/assets)_comm. banks -0.15 -4.26 0.00 
ln(equity/assets)2_comm. banks  0.01  1.96 0.05 
ln(equity/assets)_savings banks  1.11  6.80 0.00 
ln(equity/assets)2_savings banks  0.21  7.86 0.00 
ln(equity/assets)_coop. banks  0.51 10.03 0.00 
ln(equity/assets)2_coop. banks  0.10 11.86 0.00 
dummy savings banks  2.63  6.12 0.00 
dummy coop. banks -0.15 -13.49 0.00 
Intercept 3.07 48.08 0.00 
Number of observations 19,551   
F(80, 19,470) 25,462.91   
Adjusted R-square 0.99   
  
Explanation: Coefficients of time dummies have not been shown. 
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